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CRIMINAL SPEECH AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
BENJAMIN MEANS*
Lawrence Horn hired a contract killer to murder his son and his ex-
wife because he stood to inherit two million dollars.' The hit man took
the assignment, strangled the boy (who was confined to a wheelchair),
and shot his mother and his nurse, following detailed instructions
offered in a manual2 he had obtained.3 The hit man was soon caught,
perhaps because he neglected to follow some of the book's instructions
for evading detection.4 After learning that the murderer had relied
upon a "how-to" book, the victims' families sued the publisher, Paladin
Enterprises, for wrongful death under an aiding and abetting theory
Plaintiffs argued, in essence, that the publisher should be held
responsible for the dire consequences of the speech it had published and
made available to the public.' Paladin Enterprises moved for summary
judgment on free speech grounds, stipulating for purposes of the motion
that it had intended some readers to rely on Hit Man to commit crimes,
but contending that the First Amendment was an absolute bar to both
* Associate, Davis, Polk & Wardwell. Former law clerk to the Honorable Rosemary S.
Pooler of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. J.D., University of
Michigan, 1999. I am grateful to Kendra Cheves, Sherman Clark, Adam Cox, Matthew Hall,
Peter Hammer, Christopher Serkin, Paul Spagnoletti, and James Boyd White for their helpful
comments and encouragement.
1. Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233,239 (4th Cir. 1997).
2. REx FERAL, HIT MAN: A TECHNICAL MANUAL FOR INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS
(1983). A well-known First Amendment scholar who represented the plaintiffs described the
book as follows:
On one level, the book is pure recipe-a detailed, step-by-step technical explanation
of how to go into the business of becoming a professional hit man, plan murders, and
carry them out. On another level, the book is incitement and exhortation, written in
tones that incessantly cajole and encourage and embolden, propelling the would-be
assassin to take the plunge and become a real man, a nihilistic, efficient, cold-
blooded murdering machine.
ROD SMOLLA, DELIBERATE INTENT: A LAWYER TELLS THE TRUE STORY OF MURDER BY
THE BOOK ix (1999).
3. Paladin, 128 F.3d at 239, 241-42 (citing the parties' joint stipulation of facts).




criminal prosecution and civil liability.7
In deciding the defendant's motion, the district court and the
appellate court sharply disagreed, not about the content of free speech
protection, but about whether the First Amendment applied in the first
place.8 The district court found, as a matter of law, that the publisher's
distribution of Hit Man was protected under the First Amendment.9
The Fourth Circuit disagreed, holding that illegal acts receive no First
Amendment protection, even if they involve speech, and that the
stipulated facts suggested the presence of such illegality."0 Hence, at
trial plaintiffs would only have to establish the standard elements of
aiding and abetting, and defendants could not invoke the First
Amendment as a defense."
The Hit Man case highlights an unresolved tension in the law. On
the one hand, it is black-letter law that the First Amendment prohibits
governmental sanctioning of speech unless that speech incites
"imminent lawless action and is likely to incite ... such action.""1 On
the other hand, courts hold that crime receives no free speech protection
merely because it is in the form of speech. 3 These positions are not
7. Id. at 242.
8. See id. at 250.
9. See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 836, 849 (D. Md. 1996) ("[Hiowever
loathsome one characterizes the publication, Hit Man simply does not fall within the
parameters of any of the recognized exceptions to the general First Amendment principles of
freedom of speech.").
10. See Paladin, 128 F.3d at 242-43. The court held:
Because long-established caselaw [sic] provides that speech-even speech by the
press-that constitutes criminal aiding and abetting does not enjoy the protection of
the First Amendment, and because we are convinced that such case law is both
correct and equally applicable to speech that constitutes civil aiding and abetting of
criminal conduct.., we hold. .. that the First Amendment does not pose a bar to
finding that Paladin is civilly liable as an aider and abetter of Perry's triple contract
murder.
Id.
11. Id. On the eve of trial, Paladin Press agreed to a multi-million-dollar settlement. See
SMOLLA, supra note 2, at 272.
12. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). The court stated:
[Tihe constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State
to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action.
Id.
13. See, e.g., Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502. (1949) (finding on
[86:501
2002] CRIMINAL SPEECH
necessarily incompatible, 4 but the distinction between speech and crime
remains thinly reasoned and poorly understood. 5 As a result, the scope
of the freedom of speech is not governed by any consistent view of the
nature of expression and is dangerously arbitrary. 6
This Article proposes a more coherent theoretical regime for
distinguishing speech and crime-an approach that cuts across the areas
of criminal speech and symbolic speech. The aim is to incorporate well
established law and scholarship concerning the distinction between
conduct and expression into a broader theoretical framework. Within
this framework, the threshold distinction between crime and speech can
better be understood as a version of the familiar distinction that courts
rely upon when seeking to identify whether conduct (such as marching
or nude dancing) is sufficiently expressive so as to merit First
Amendment protection. By framing the distinction between speech and
crime in terms of the broad principles identified by courts and scholars
the facts that picketing with placards constituted unlawful restraint of trade, despite the fact
"that the agreements and course of conduct here were ... brought about through speaking or
writing"). The Court stated that "it has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of
speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part
initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed."
Id.
14. Cf. Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249,
1250 (1995) ("Like any legal provision, the [First] Amendment must contain threshold
conditions that specify when its particular doctrines and values will be activated and
applied."). Applying the Brandenburg test to all speech would produce impossible results.
Professor Van Alstyne accurately describes this justification of limitations on the extent of the
First Amendment as animated by the "irresistible counterexample"-"[t]he necessary
consequence is to concede that there must be some degree of moderation contemplated by
the first amendment [sic] despite first impressions to the contrary." William Van Alstyne, A
Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CAL. L. REV. 107, 113-14 (1982) (citing Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes' famous example of shouting "fire" in a crowded movie theater).
15. Such problems are not unique to one area of First Amendment jurisprudence. See,
e.g., Post, supra note 14, at 1249-50 ("Although the pattern of the Court's recent First
Amendment decisions may well be (roughly) defensible, contemporary First Amendment
doctrine is nevertheless striking chiefly for its superficiality, its internal incoherence, its
distressing failure to facilitate constructive judicial engagement with significant contemporary
social issues connected with freedom of speech.").
16. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 10 (1970):
A system of free expression can be successful only when it rests upon the strongest
possible commitment to the positive right and the narrowest possible basis for
exceptions. And any such exceptions must be clear-cut, precise, and readily
controlled. Otherwise the forces that press toward restriction will break through the
openings, and freedom of expression will become the exception and suppression the
rule.
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in a context where similar First Amendment goals are at stake, 7 this
Article seeks to provide an approach to distinguishing speech and crime
that is both intelligible and workable.
To be clear, the aim is not simply to replace one set of formalistic
categories with another, but to articulate a method of analysis.
Nonetheless, this discussion will use the terms "conduct" or "action,"
and "speech" or "expression" as shorthand for the outcomes generated
by applying the appropriate principles to distinguish verbal or nonverbal
acts that do not merit First Amendment coverage from those that do.
Other scholars have proposed various kinds of speech/conduct or
expression/action distinctions." This version differs, however, first in its
insistence on the importance of separating questions of scope from
questions of content; unless courts apply the First Amendment, and do
not avoid it where it seems inconvenient, the content of free speech
protections is not even worth talking about. Second, a method of
analysis is developed in light of established case law and scholarship
concerning symbolic speech, contending that criminal speech and
symbolic speech should be thought of as two aspects of the same whole.
Thus, the expression/action idea is used to connect two areas of the First
Amendment that previously have not been linked explicitly. Finally,
unlike Professor Greenawalt, who deliberately eschews engaging
linguistic philosophy concepts for fear that they lead to "significant line-
drawing problems," 9 this Article attempts to show that a practical
approach to the speech/conduct distinction can, in fact, be consistent
with the view that speech-acts are not distinguishable in kind from other
acts.20
Part I argues that the distinction between speech and crime is far
from self-evident, and as a consequence, courts have broad discretion to
characterize verbal acts as speech or as crime. First Amendment law,
17. Evidence law, for instance, also distinguishes between conduct and speech in certain
hearsay contexts, but the purposes of evidence law and the First Amendment are not closely
aligned.
18. For example, Professor Emerson contends that the expression/action distinction
should be the organizing principle of First Amendment law. See EMERSON, supra note 16, at
17. Kent Greenawalt in part adopts that view, but proposes that utterances be evaluated in
terms of whether they are "situation-altering," and contends that the expression/action
distinction is important but not "the central key to First Amendment adjudication." KENT
GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 229 (1989).
19. GREENAWALT, supra note 18, at 58.
20. For a good introduction to linguistic philosophy, see JOHN L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO
THINGS WITH WORDS, (J.D. Urmson & Marina Sbisa eds., 1975); JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH
ACTS, AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (1969).
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however robust in principle, means little if judges can avoid it
altogether. As Hit Man and other cases illustrate, outcomes often hinge
upon the unelaborated threshold determination of whether the First
Amendment applies at all .
Part II identifies tests traditionally employed to identify when
conduct should be treated as speech and incorporates them into a
broader theoretical regime that also addresses when speech should be
treated as conduct. The task of identifying physical acts that merit First
Amendment protection is therefore linked to the task of identifying
verbal acts that do not. Part III defends this method of analysis against
two contradictory objections: (1) that speech is completely distinct from
conduct so that any attempt to link the two is disingenuous; and (2) that
speech is completely indistinguishable from conduct so that any attempt
to separate the two is disingenuous.
Part IV demonstrates the utility of the model developed in Part II by
using it to reexamine the cases discussed in Part I. While the principles
gleaned from the cases and scholarship addressing symbolic speech do
not provide a mechanical test for identifying criminal speech, they do
offer a general framework for analysis that can be refined. By engaging
in such an analysis, courts will at least ensure that the outcome
determinative decision of whether to apply the First Amendment is
explained adequately, thus reducing the risk that the crime exception to
the First Amendment will undermine the American commitment to
freedom of speech.
I. CURRENT DOCTRINE
The existing regime for distinguishing speech and crime depends
upon an implicit assumption that speech and crime are self-evident and
mutually exclusive concepts. Unfortunately, the situation is more
complicated, and the lack of a coherent theory behind those formalistic
categories has led to unsatisfying results.
A. Brandenburg
First Amendment doctrine concerning illegal advocacy requires a
strong showing of imminence. Under Brandenburg v. Ohio," the
government may not "forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or
21. Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 250 (4th Cir. 1997). If the First
Amendment applies, speech may still ultimately be regulated. However, government
regulation will be subjected to far stricter scrutiny.
22. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
2002]
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of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action. "23
Applying the Brandenburg test, the Supreme Court overturned the
conviction of a defendant accused of treason who, in declaring his
opposition to the draft, exclaimed that "[i]f they ever make me carry a
rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J. '"24 The Court found
that the speech was mere hyperbole." Similarly, in Hess v. Indiana,26 the
Court struck down the conviction of a demonstrator who shouted,
"[w]e'll take the fucking street later," declaring that the lawlessness
advocated was not sufficiently immediate, because "later" was not
"imminent." 7 Likewise, a NAACP organizer was not liable for inciting
violence when he addressed a crowd as follows: "If we catch any of you
going in any of them racist stores, we're gonna break your damn neck."
21
In short, it is very difficult to impose liability on speech, even speech
that advocates crime, if it falls within the scope of the First Amendment
as set forth in Brandenburg.29 For that reason, a court faced with speech
23. Id. at 447. The Brandenburg test is itself a way of distinguishing between speech that
is best thought of as speech, and speech that is more like conduct and thus not shielded by the
First Amendment. See Amy Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 921,
975-76 (2001) (stating that "sometimes, speech may erupt into illegal conduct in a way so
immediate that the two merge to become one and the same"). "This is the problem that
gripped the Court for many years in the subversive advocacy cases and that led to the
Brandenburg 'incitement to imminent lawless action' test." Id. at 967. However, as
previously noted, the Court has also stated that criminal speech receives no First Amendment
protection. It is apparent, therefore, that the Court also has in mind the exclusion from free
speech of at least some utterances that might not satisfy the exacting Brandenburg test.
24. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706, 708 (1969) (per curiam).
25. Id. at 708.
26. 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
27. Id. at 107-09.
28. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 902 (1982).
29. This is not to say that the Brandenburg test is insuperable. Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). On occasion, a defendant's conduct will be egregious
enough to allow for liability despite the initial availability of a First Amendment defense. See,
e.g., California v. Rubin, 158 Cal. Rptr. 488 (Ct. App. 1979). At a press conference to protest
a planned Nazi march in Skokie, Illinois, a member of the Jewish Defense League made the
following statement:
We are offering five hundred dollars, that I have in my hand, to any member of the
community, be he Gentile or Jewish, who kills, maims, or seriously injures a member
of the American Nazi Party .... And if they bring us the ears, we'll make it a
thousand dollars. The fact of the matter is, that we're deadly serious. This is not
said in jest, we are deadly serious.
Id. at 488-89., The district court held that the speech was mere hyperbole and per se
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it finds intolerable may be sorely tempted to find a way to escape free
speech strictures.
B. The Crime Exception
The Supreme Court ostensibly allows content-based restrictions only
for speech that falls into one of a handful of narrow exceptions: fighting
words,30 obscenity,3 commercial speech,32 or incitement to imminent
lawless activity.3 In reality, courts regulate a great deal more speech by
excluding it from the scope of the First Amendment. Thus, despite the
strong protection afforded free speech under the First Amendment,
courts can punish some disfavored speech by characterizing it as crime,
steeling to action,34 or "speech ... brigaded with action."35
While the Supreme Court has made clear that "illegal advocacy" can
only be sanctioned in very limited circumstances,36 the Court has made
it equally clear that crime does not receive First Amendment protection
merely because it is in the guise of speech.37 Even Justice Douglas, a
staunch supporter of free speech, acknowledged that speech is "subject
to regulation" where "brigaded with action."3  Consequently, First
protected, but a divided court of appeals reversed and held that because the Brandenburg
standard could be satisfied, the defendant would have to stand trial. See id. at 493.
30. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942).
31. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485-86 (1957); see also New York v. Ferber,
458 U.S. 747 (1982) (child pornography).
32. See Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
785 (1976) (disapproving earlier Supreme Court cases which entirely excluded commercial
speech from First Amendment protection but allowing regulation of "false and misleading"
commercial speech).
33. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
34. Id. at 448.
35. Id. at 456 (Douglas, J., concurring); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 536-37 (1958)
(Douglas, J., concurring).
36. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
37. See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949). The Model
Penal Code includes at least twenty-one crimes that can be committed through speech. See
GREENAWALT, supra note 18, at 6-7. Those include, for example: (1) reaching an
agreement with someone else to engage in criminal conduct, MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(1)
(1962) (criminal conspiracy); (2) offering to pay or receive a bribe, id. §§ 248.8, 240.1, 240.3-
240.7; and (3) threatening another person with severe harm, id. § 211.3 (terroristic threats).
38. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 456 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas's
formulation broadly foreshadows the argument here by casting the distinction between
speech and crime in terms of conduct. No analysis supports his phrase, however, and First
Amendment law has never systematically viewed speech and crime through the lens of
conduct. Developing the theoretical underpinning of speech as conduct (for example, by
linking it to law concerning conduct as expression) permits us to make good use of the
speech/conduct distinction rather than employing it as another way to rationalize after the
20021
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Amendment protections apply only if a court first decides that the
matter before it is speech and not crime.39
In many cases, a court can characterize an utterance as either crime
or speech as it sees fit, because the decision rests almost entirely within
the court's discretion."° The practice bears a resemblance to the "escape
devices" that courts have employed in other areas of the law-for
example, in conflicts of law-to exploit the ambiguity behind apparently
rigid legal categories. 4' The court's decision does not follow from
fact a First Amendment decision that rests on other grounds.
39. See Post, supra note 14, at 1250. "A court can uphold government regulations on the
ground that they need not be evaluated according to First Amendment standards, or it can
uphold the same regulations on the quite different ground that, having applied First
Amendment standards, the regulations are valid and withstand constitutional scrutiny." Id.
Therefore, "in order to determine which path of analysis a court should pursue, we must have
boundary criteria for deciding when First Amendment standards shall be brought into play."
Id.
40. Such formal guidance as does exist in separating speech and crime is hopelessly
vague. For example, the Model Penal Code's Commentary advises that "[o]ne who uses
words as a means to crime ... does not make a contribution to community discussion that is
worthy of protection." MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.02 cmt., 375-76. That formulation sweeps
so broadly, however, that it might be understood to include within the definition of crime
precisely the sort of advocacy Brandenburg means to protect. The phrase, "a means to
crime" is nothing more than a restatement of the question: when does speech become so
intertwined with crime that it may be regulated, indeed punished, without regard for the
protection afforded speech by the First Amendment?
Nor can courts look to academic treatments of the issue for specific guidance. The
unfettered discretion courts have to make the threshold determination between speech and
crime has gone mostly unrecognized, even though some scholars, perhaps most notably Kent
Greenawalt, have addressed the topic. See, GREENAWALT, supra note 18. Greenawalt's
book is a nuanced discussion of the content and scope of the freedom of speech, analyzing the
level of protection courts should afford different kinds of speech acts and arguing that the
level should vary based upon numerous factors. Id. Greenawalt's analysis, cogent as it is,
does not really focus upon the crucial first step, when a court must decide whether to apply
the First Amendment. Id. This Article seeks to fill that gap. Thus, this Article takes as
background the strong protection afforded advocacy of illegality by Brandenburg, and does
not address subtleties in the way Brandenburg might be applied in different contexts. For
that reason, the locus of inquiry here is narrower than that of other scholars who debate how
much freedom of speech the First Amendment requires, depending upon the connection
between speech and crime, across a great variety of situations.
41. See LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS 28 (2d ed. 1995) (stating that escape
devices "threatened the [formal choice of law] goals of uniformity and predictability"); see
also Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 728 n.2 (1988) (acknowledging degree to which
formal choice of law rules are undercut by the availability of escape devices). A court
employs an escape device when it decides a case for unstated reasons and then manipulates
legal rules to justify the result. See id. The court's articulation of the law masks the concerns
that actually motivated its decision. See ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS
LAW 261 (4th ed. 1986) (noting that escape devices "achieve results that must be justified, if
at all, by other real reasons"). Escape devices may be employed where, for example, a court's
actual reasoning is entirely foreclosed by existing law, insufficient to sustain the desired result,
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rigorous analysis of whether the subject activity is speech; rather, the
court's sense of whether the subject activity is properly regulable
dictates whether it is labeled speech. The critical issue-why the court
treated the speech as speech or as crime-remains unexplained.
It is not necessary to assume that courts deliberately engage in
escape devices. A court may simply assume that the law supports its
intuitive sense of a just outcome and reach for the precedent that fits
with that intuition, without considering that the law might also support a
contrary conclusion. Nor are courts always wrong when they
characterize a verbal act as crime outside the scope of the First
Amendment. However, to the extent courts base the decision whether
to apply free speech protection on considerations that would not be
relevant to First Amendment analysis, they evade the constraints
designed to protect unpopular speech. Moreover, even perfectly
defensible but unarticulated decisions fail to delineate the boundaries of
a properly conceived freedom of speech. Courts cannot answer the
question-when does speech connected to crime nonetheless fall within
the compass of the First Amendment-unless they first ask it.
C. Case Law
In light of the confused state of the law concerning the boundary
between speech and crime, it is not surprising that the district court and
the appellate court in the Hit Man case arrived at contrary conclusions
as to whether the First Amendment applied, each court invoking one of
the two overlapping doctrines." As the Hit Man case and other cases
illustrate, the lack of a clear theoretical underpinning for the distinction
between speech and crime leads to troubling and superficial decisions.
1. Hit Man
The Hit Man case demonstrates why the threshold determination of
whether the First Amendment applies is so often dispositive. The
district court concluded that "[t]he First Amendment bars the
imposition of civil liability on Paladin unless Hit Man falls within one of
or simply more controversial.
42. For example, it would make no sense for society to treat a ransom note or the bomb
threat as free speech, and courts routinely deny First Amendment protection to those who
bribe, extort, and threaten. But cf. Lyle Denniston, Absolutism: Unadorned, and Without
Apology, 81 GEO. L.J. 351 (1992) (espousing the view that "no law" means "no law" while
acknowledging and accepting the serious harm to society that would follow from such a view).
43. Compare Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 836, 840-41 (D. Md. 1996); with
Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 267 (4th Cir. 1997).
20021
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the well defined and narrowly limited classes of speech that are
unprotected by the First Amendment."" The court found that "the
Defendants must have intended imminent lawless action. In other
words, Defendants must have intended that James Perry would go out
and murder Mildred Horn, Trevor Horn, and Janice Saunders
immediately. "'  The plaintiffs could not meet that standard, as few
plaintiffs in media distribution cases could." The court's logic carried it
from the initial invocation of the First Amendment to the conclusion
that the speech must be protected."'
The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the First Amendment did
not apply at all." The court began its analysis by acknowledging the
importance of free speech: "[A] right to advocate lawlessness is, almost
paradoxically, one of the ultimate safeguards of liberty .... Without the
freedom to criticize that which constrains, there is no freedom at all."
4 9
The court quickly noted, though, that "it is equally well established that
speech which, in its effect, is tantamount to legitimately proscribable
nonexpressive conduct may itself be legitimately proscribed, punished,
or regulated incidentally to the constitutional enforcement of generally
applicable statutes."' o The court supported that maxim with a slippery
slope argument: "Were the First Amendment to bar or to limit
government regulation of such 'speech brigaded with action,' the
government would be powerless to protect the public from countless of
even the most pernicious criminal acts and civil wrongs.51
What is missing from the Fourth Circuit's decision is an explanation
of precisely what allows it to distinguish speech and crime. The court
lists obvious examples, such as ransom notes and robbery commands,
but does not elaborate." Is the distinction to be drawn simply based
upon common sense? One might wonder whether the result in the Hit
Man case would have been any different if the book instructed the
reader in marijuana growing techniques; if the book explained how to
44. Paladin, 940 F. Supp. at 840-41 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942)).
45. Id. at 847 (invoking the Brandenburg standard).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 848.
48. See Paladin, 128 F.3d at 267.
49. Id. at 243.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 244 (internal citations omitted) (citing various provisions of the Model Penal
Code).
52. Id. at 252-55.
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organize effective civil disobedience to protest globalization; or, to cite a
real world example, if it had explained how to break computer
encryption.53
2. Angel Dust
In United States v. Barnett,54 the issue was drugs, not murder. The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the First Amendment
was not a defense to the charge that the defendant had aided and
abetted the attempted manufacture of phencyclidine (PCP) by selling
written instructions for manufacturing the drug.55  When Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents executed a search warrant
at the home of Donald Eugene Helmsley, he was preparing PCP and
reading a paper called "Synthesis of PCP-Preparation of Angel
Dust. " 6 The agents soon traced the paper to its source, Gary Barnett,
whom they caught depositing in the United States mail an envelope
containing several documents that explained how to manufacture PCP
and other illegal drugs and which also suggested precautionary measures
to avoid alerting the DEA.57 In the district court, Barnett moved to
dismiss the case on the ground that he had a First Amendment right to
disseminate the material.58 The district court rejected Barnett's First
Amendment defense, 9 and the Ninth Circuit agreed.'
The Ninth Circuit first noted that the allegations against Barnett, if
proved, would constitute the crime of aiding and abetting.6' The court
defined an abettor as one "'who, with mens rea,... commands, counsels
or otherwise encourages the perpetrator to commit the crime.'"62 The
53. See, e.g., Bernstein v. United States Dep't of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1141 (9th Cir.
1999) (holding that encryption software in source code form as used by cryptologists to
communicate ideas is First Amendment expression); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley,
273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Siva Vaidhyanathan et al., The Year in Ideas: An
Encyclopedia of Innovations, Conceptual Leaps, Harebrained Schemes, Cultural Tremors &
Hindsight Reckonings that Made a Difference in 2001, in THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE,
Dec. 9, 2001, at 100 (discussing idea that "Software is Free Speech," but not classifying it as
"conceptual leap" or "harebrained scheme").
54. 667 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1982).
55. Id. at 841.
56. Id. at 838.
57. Id. at 839.
58. Id. at 837-38.
59. United States v. Barnett, 507 F. Supp. 670, 672 (E.D. Cal. 1981).
60. Barnett, 667 F.2d at 841-43.
61. Id. at 841; see 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (anyone who "aids, abets, counsels, commands,
induces or procures" a crime against the United States "is punishable as a principal").
62. Barnett, 667 F.2d at 841 (quoting PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 645 (2d ed. 1969)).
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court rejected any requirement that the crime happen in close temporal
proximity to the counsel provided by the alleged aider and abettor: "The
fact that the... encouragement is not acted upon for long periods of
time does not break the actual connection between the commission of
the crime and the advice to commit it." 63  According to the court, a
defendant might be found guilty for even the natural tendency of his
counsel .64
Under First Amendment law, temporal proximity would be of major
importance, because Brandenburg does not permit prosecution of
speech unless it incites immediate lawless behavior.65  The "natural
tendency" test is a relic from the bad-old-days of First Amendment law
when war protesters were readily imprisoned for sedition.66 Moreover,
the law requires actual "incitement" for speech to fall outside the First
67Amendment's protection. Mere counseling or encouragement would
not suffice.66
Since he had either committed the crime of aiding and abetting or
had engaged in protected free speech, Barnett's case hinged on whether
the court would apply the First Amendment. The court summarily
refused to apply the First Amendment, holding that "[t]he first
amendment [sic] does not provide a defense to a criminal charge simply
because the actor uses words to carry out his illegal purpose., 69 In
allowing Barnett's conviction to stand, the court implied that the First
Amendment would never apply in situations where a speaker counseled
or encouraged another person to commit a crime. While that position
would directly contradict Brandenburg and its progeny, the court failed
to acknowledge or articulate any limiting principles.
3. Taxes
Even in tax protest cases, courts sometimes deny First Amendment
63. Id. at 840. "We know of no rule of law which fixes a time limit within which the
crime must be perpetrated." Id. (quoting Workman v. State, 21 N.E.2d 712,714 (Ind. 1939)).
64. Id. "An aider and abettor 'is liable for any criminal act which in the ordinary course
of things was the natural or probable consequence of the crime that he advised or
commanded, although such consequence may not have been intended by him.'" Id. (quoting
Russell v. United States, 222 F.2d 197, 199 (5th Cir. 1955)).
65. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
66. See, e.g., Shaffer v. United States, 255 F. 886, 887 (9th Cir. 1919).
67. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
68. Id. at 448-49.
69. Barnett, 667 F.2d at 842.
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protection. In United States v. Buttorff,70 cited with approval by Barnett,
the Eighth Circuit denied free speech protection to the leaders of a tax
protest group.7' Gordon S. Buttorff and Charles A. Dodge were
convicted by a jury of aiding and abetting several people in filing false or
fraudulent income tax returns. 72  They had both addressed several
gatherings of John Deere employees and discussed "the Constitution,
the Bible, and the unconstitutionality of the graduated income tax." 
73
"Only one principal testified to an affirmative action, other than
speaking, by either defendant."N Thus, as the court summarized:
The problem here, of course, is that each defendant's only
participation in the allegedly illegal activity of the principals,
except with regard to [one principal], was to talk about his ideas
before gatherings of disgruntled Americans. What this court
must decide is whether the first amendment [sic]... prohibit[s]
the convictions of these defendants ....
The court found that while "the speeches here [did] not incite the
type of imminent lawless activity referred to in criminal syndicalism
cases, the defendants did go beyond mere advocacy of tax reform.
7
Therefore, the court concluded that the speeches were not entitled to
First Amendment protection and affirmed the convictions.77
Buttorff puts the distinction between speech and crime in stark
terms. The court explicitly acknowledged that the government would
not be able to satisfy the Brandenburg test in that there was no
incitement of imminent lawless activity.7" Nonetheless, the court
allowed the prosecution of a speaker for his ideas to stand. Although
the court stated that the speaker had gone beyond "mere advocacy,"
though not so far as "incitement,"79 it did not explain what that middle
ground was or why it was significant so as to distinguish the tax-protest
speech from the statement in Brandenburg that "[w]e're not a revengent
70. 572 F.2d 619, 628 (8th Cir. 1978).
71. Id.
72. See id. at 621-22; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (aiding and abetting).
73. Buttorff, 572 F.2d at 622.
74. Id. at 623. Buttorff supplied one principal with a W-4 form and may have altered the
number of deductions listed. Id.
75. Id.






organization, but if our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court,
continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's possible that there
might have to be some revengeance taken."80
4. Natural Born Killers
Cases avoiding the First Amendment can reinforce each other. In
Byers v. Edmonson,8" a Louisiana appellate court held that a shooting
victim could maintain a cause of action against Time Warner, Oliver
Stone, and various producers of the movie, Natural Born Killers.82 The
plaintiff sued after assailants, allegedly inspired by the movie, shot her
during the armed robbery of a convenience store. 3 Quoting extensively
from the Hit Man case, the court concluded that it was enough that
plaintiff alleged that the defendants "produced and released a film
containing violent imagery which was intended to cause its viewers to
imitate the violent imagery."84  By refusing to apply the First
Amendment, the court obviated the necessity of measuring the movie
against the requirements of Brandenburg.
Byers traces back to the Hit Man case, which looks to Barnett, which
relies upon Buttorff. At bottom, then, the whole line of cases rests on
the shaky foundation of a court that refused to countenance advocacy of
tax evasion. Moreover, all of these cases depend upon the supposed
existence of a clear and obvious distinction between speech and crime.
As it should now be clear, such a distinction is anything but obvious.
II. A UNIFIED APPROACH TO SYMBOLIC SPEECH AND CRIME
The First Amendment protects speech and, thus, implicitly endorses
the separation of speech from other forms of conduct.85 Yet, while the
First Amendment does not create a general liberty interest, some forms
80. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 446 (1969) (per curiam).
81. 712 So. 2d 681 (La. Ct. App. 1998).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 687. Four years later, when the case again reached the Louisiana appellate
court, the court changed its tune and affirmed the lower court's judgment dismissing the
action against Oliver Stone and the film's producers. Byer v. Edmonson, No. 2001 CA 1184,
2002 La. App. LEXIS 1809, at **16-17. The court held that the "decision to imitate the
characters of a film is more a regrettable commentary on their own culpability, than a danger
of free expression requiring courts to chill such speech through civil penalties." Id.
85. See Adler, supra note 23, at 972; see also EMERSON, supra note 16, at 17 ("The
central idea of a system of freedom of expression is that a fundamental distinction must be




of conduct are nonetheless treated as symbolic speech and protected
under the First Amendment.86 Marching,87 flag burning,"8 and campaign
contributions 9 all count as protected expression. It is accepted as a
general matter, then, that conduct may have expressive value sufficient
to bring it within the scope of the First Amendment.
This Article contends that for the same reasons that conduct may
sometimes have characteristics that merit First Amendment protection,
speech may lack such characteristics and properly be treated as crime.'
Linking the theoretical projects of speech/crime and conduct/speech
along one continuum allows the creation of a more encompassing
theoretical regime for addressing the boundary issues of speech.
Importantly, a continuum between conduct and speech can operate in
both directions. Just as conduct sometimes is treated as symbolic
speech, it is appropriate that speech is sometimes treated simply as
crime. In undertaking this project, it makes sense to start with symbolic
speech scholarship and case law, because it is the product of a more
serious effort to develop a theoretical approach adequate to the task.
(Beyond stating that speech will not be protected when it is "brigaded
86. For a discussion of why speech should be singled out for such special constitutional
status, see, for example, EMERSON, supra note 16, at 8-9 (arguing that speech is more
valuable and less dangerous than action); David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity
Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1974)
(discussing high value of speech). But cf. Lawrence Alexander & Paul Horton, The
Impossibility of a Free Speech Principle, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1319, 1322 (1984) (doubting "that
any theory could successfully establish and justify free speech as an independent value or
principle of general application").
87. See Nat'l Socialist Party of Am. v. Skokie, 434 U.S. 1327 (1977).
88. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1967).
89. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); see also CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND
THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 94 (2d ed. 1995) ("[A]n expenditure of money is an
important means by which people communicate ideas, and the First Amendment requires a
strong justification for any government regulation of an important means of
communication.").
90. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 795, 836 (1993)
(arguing that "speech that amounts to the commission of an independently illegal act... is
properly treated as action" but that any other speech associated with illegality must "qualify
as speech"). As discussed infra, this Article goes beyond instances where the language is in
and of itself the crime and argues that speech falls outside the coverage of the First
Amendment and amounts to conduct whenever it lacks communicative value. Sunstein also
states that describing "words as 'conduct' provides a shorthand, if misleading, description of a
more extended argument that the speech at issue does not promote First Amendment values
and creates sufficient harms to be regulable under the appropriate standards." Id. at 837. To
the extent that labeling the speech "conduct" is a shorthand for the analysis in this context,
however, it is just as much a shorthand to label conduct "symbolic speech." The important
thing is to make sure that those labels do not substitute for careful analysis of the conduct or
speech.
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with action," almost no work has been done to develop the distinction as
it pertains to speech and crime.)91
Ultimately, what 'is important is not the formulation of a rigid test,
but that important criteria are identified. The criteria should include:
(1) the intent of the speaker/actor; (2) the understanding of the
listener/observer; (3) the existence of speech-neutral reasons for
government suppression; and (4) the social context in which the
speech/action takes place.92
A. Conduct as Speech
What follows is not a comprehensive survey, but rather an analysis
and synthesis of a few representative examples of approaches to
distinguishing conduct and speech.
1. Intent to Communicate and Listener Understanding
In Spence v. Washington,93 the United States Supreme Court
explicitly addressed the scope of the First Amendment 4 in determining
whether a student could be punished under a statute that prohibited
exhibiting an American flag containing any additional "figure, mark,
91. Kent Greenawalt's "'situation-altering' utterances" formulation is the most notable
exception. GREENAWALT, supra note 18, at 40. As discussed supra note 18, this Article's
approach differs in a number of respects, but at a broader level of generality (one which
would also encompass Emerson's distinctions between speech and conduct) the approaches
are roughly compatible. Though this is mostly a semantic quibble, Greenawalt's conception
of situation-altering utterances seems problematic to the extent it suggests that the
considerations that govern whether an utterance should best be treated as First Amendment
speech are folded into the utterance itself. Characterizing an utterance as situation-altering
puts the cart before the horse, because we cannot decide whether the utterance is situation-
altering until we first have a clearer grasp of the situation. In fact, Greenawalt's analysis
seems more geared to address whether an utterance is "situation-altered."
92. Without some doctrinal guidance, we would be left with a mushy balancing test, such
as the one Professor Emerson proposed:
The guiding principle must be to determine which element is predominant in the
conduct under consideration. Is expression the major element and the action only
secondary? Or is the action the essence and the expression incidental? The answer,
to a great extent, must be based on a common-sense reaction, made in light of the
functions and operations of a system of freedom of expression.
EMERSON, supra note 16, at 80. It has been observed that this involves "a subjective
judgment, turning at times on rather arbitrary classifications." Melville B. Nimmer, The
Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First Amendment, 21 UCLA L. REV. 29, 32 (1973).
93. 418 U.S. 405,409 (1974) (per curiam).
94. See Post, supra note 14, at 1251 ("To the extent that contemporary First Amendment
doctrine has self-consciously addressed [the question of the First Amendment's scope], it has
been through the case of Spence v. Washington .... ).
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picture, design, [or] drawing."" The student had protested the Vietnam
war by hanging a flag upside down with a peace symbol taped over it.96
In order to decide whether to apply the First Amendment, the Court
asked whether "[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was
present, and [whether] in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood
was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed
it." Finding that Spence's flag satisfied that standard, the Court
determined that Spence's actions were protected by the First
Amendment.98
The Supreme Court's criteria-intent and likelihood of
understanding-guide lower courts,99 and the Court has also continued
to rely upon the test." In addition, while the test has been much
criticized,"1 some scholars have found the reasoning persuasive.12 The
Court thus focuses upon expressivity, at least as an initial matter. As
discussed below, the Court and some scholars have identified additional
factors to consider with respect to acts that are expressive under the
Spence test.
2. Government Purpose
Professor Melville Nimmer's analysis of what actions should receive
First Amendment protection begins with the proposition that "all
human conduct may be said to convey ideas or meaning.""'° Professor
Nimmer concludes that "as an irreducible minimum [the act in question]
must constitute a communication."' He elaborates, along the lines of
the Spence test, that communication involves an "actual or potential"
audience and a speaker "intending to convey a meaning by his
95. Spence, 418 U.S. at 407 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.86.020 (West 1988)).
96. Id. at 405.
97. Id. at 410-11.
98. Id. at 415.
99. See, e.g., United States v. Hayward, 6 F.3d 1241, 1249-50 (7th Cir. 1993); Steirer v.
Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 987 F.2d 989, 995-97 (3d Cir. 1993); Young v. New York City
Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 153-54 (2d Cir. 1990); Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821, 827-28 (6th
Cir. 1989).
100. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403-04 (1989) (citing Spence, 418 U.S. at
410-11).
101. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment's Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767,
773 (2001) ("Spence is a profoundly unsatisfactory test .... ").
102. Cass Sunstein, for example, argues "that what is apparently conduct should qualify
as speech for First Amendment purposes if it is intended and received as an effort to
communicate a message." Sunstein, supra note 90, at 836.





Mindful of the difficulty of identifying "assertive" conduct, to say
nothing of a speaker's intent, Nimmer emphasizes the importance of the
purpose of government regulation.16 Nimmer explains that "a non-
speech interest is an interest by the state in suppressing or regulating a
nonmeaning effect. In contrast, an anti-speech interest is an interest by
the state in suppressing or regulating a meaning effect."'0'7 Nimmer
"concluded that if the state can pose a non-speech interest as the basis
for suppressing conduct, then such conduct should not be regarded as
protectible under the first amendment [sic] even if the actor clearly
intends such conduct to communicate a message-that is, to have a
meaning effect. "1 08
Nimmer's proposal draws upon and elaborates the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. O'Brien.'O In O'Brien, where the defendant
had burned his draft card in a public protest of the Vietnam war, the
Supreme Court held that expressive conduct may be regulated if, among
other things, "the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression
of free expression."'"0 The Court found that the relevant law (which
prohibited destruction of draft cards) was aimed at preserving the draft
system, not suppressing speech, and therefore affirmed the conviction."'
3. Symbolic v. Non-Symbolic Acts
In "Speech Acts" and the First Amendment, 2 Professor Franklyn
Haiman argues "that a fundamental difference obtains between
symbolic and nonsymbolic interactions and that the First Amendment is
always implicated in the former and only occasionally in the latter.""'
105. Id.
106. Id. at 36-38. In so doing, Nimmer took a skeptical view of a proposal made by a
note in the Columbia Law Review that symbolic speech requires that "the conduct should be
assertive in nature ... that the conduct is a departure from the actor's normal activities and
cannot adequately be explainedunless a desire to communicate is presumed." Id. at 37
(quoting Note, Symbolic Conduct, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1091,1117 (1968)).
107. Id. at 38. As support for the distinction, Nimmer cited the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). Id.
108. Id. at 39; cf. LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 827-28
(2d ed. 1988) (arguing that the First Amendment applies where the government's purpose is
to suppress a viewpoint).
109. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
110. Id. at 377.
111. Id. at 381-82.
112. FRANKLYN S. HAIMAN, "SPEECH ACTS" AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993).
113. Id. at 5.
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Under Professor Haiman's theory, symbolic conduct may be restricted
only for content-neutral reasons."4 For example, political assassination
may communicate a message, but it has "palpable physical consequences
that cannot be tolerated.""' 5 Conversely, this Article's argument is that
to the extent certain conduct is more "symbolic," it is also the case that
certain utterances are less "symbolic."
Professor Haiman would not likely approve of this use of his theory.
While he purports to adopt the unitary view that symbolic behavior
always merits First Amendment coverage, his theory is notable for its
refusal to apply the lessons of conduct to speech. Professor Haiman
takes a very dim view of speech-act theory in general and attempts to
classify speech as conduct in particular."' Thus, he contends that
"[w]hat speech-act theorists would restrict are the symbolic elements
themselves-the ideas and meanings contained in the words, pictures, or
representations in question-for it is these elements, or more accurately
their consequences, that create the problems they seek to address.""7 In
essence, Professor Haiman's point is that while only some conduct is
symbolic, speech is always symbolic."' As "proof of this claim,"
Professor Haiman points out that "if these ideas or meanings were
expressed in a foreign language unknown to [the] audience... there
would be no harmful consequences about which to be concerned. ""9
The flaw in Professor Haiman's argument is that it identifies a
necessary condition and simply assumes that it is also sufficient. It is
indeed plain that a speech-act cannot succeed if its symbols are
unknown to the audience-for example, handing an English-speaking
bank teller a robbery note written in German is unlikely to have the
desired effect-but the success of the speech-act depends upon more
than the literal transmission of an idea from speaker to listener. The
robbery note's effectiveness depends upon an underlying threat of
violence. The difficulty is in deciding when the non-communicative
aspects of a speech-act predominate its meaning in such a way as to
preclude First Amendment application. The distinction can be difficult,
but it is a distinction that courts must. make. They will do so either
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 4 (arguing that it "is a bit of word magic whereby the flapping of vocal chords,
the scratching of a pen, the display of a picture, or the hoisting of a banner are transformed






openly or, as is now too often the case, sub rosa.
To see the contortions involved in seeking to avoid the horns of that
dilemma, we need go no further than Professor Haiman's examples of
pure symbolic speech. Professor Haiman argues that an umpire's yelling
"[y]ou're out" and a general's order to a soldier illustrate that the
"power of speech lies in its ability to persuade, not in its ability to
enact." 20 While speech "commonly precedes deeds ... it is not per se a
deed."' 2 Thus, "[like the batter who has struck out, the soldiers follow
the general's directive because they believe in the war they are fighting
(as the batter believes in the game of baseball) or because they accept
the authority of the state and are unwilling to become conscientious
objectors."'2 The general's power, in other words, cannot alter the
effect of his speech-" soldiers can, and sometimes do, disobey. They
may be shot as a result .... But until that happens... the words of the
order to advance have produced no effects."'23
Professor Haiman's argument depends upon an unjustifiably narrow
view of causation. It is hard to believe that Professor Haiman means to
argue that the words are not a cause in fact of the ultimate effect,
though he describes the relationship only temporally (words "commonly
precede[] deeds")."' More likely, he is contending that there is no
proximate causation because the words produce an effect only after
mediation in the consciousness of a listener who remains, in theory, free
to reject them. Thus, because words cannot literally perform actions,
they are not conduct.'25
Yet, no explanation is given for why words should be considered
apart from their context. Surely, umpires and generals mean to exert
the authority with which they are invested when they issue orders, and
120. Id. at 12.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 13.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 12. Cf. DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN
UNDERSTANDING 30 (Eric Steinberg ed., 1993) (arguing that in the context of the empirical
tradition-which holds that all knowledge comes from perception-we cannot prove
causation because we have no perceptual access to it. "All belief of matter of fact or real
existence is derived merely from some object, present to the memory or senses, and a
customary conjunction between that and some other object.").
125. Arguably, though, the umpire's words do literally constitute action, because they
carry weight within the rules of baseball. Thus, by yelling "you're out," the umpire "has
worked a direct change in [the player's] status according to institutional standards."
GREENAWALT, supra note 18, at 57-58. Whether the players choose to heed the umpire's
order, which is Professor Haiman's concern, is in a sense irrelevant. Whether or not he
acknowledges it, the player is out.
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players' and soldiers' responses are largely governed by that power. It
does not bode well for Haiman's absolutist view of the nature of speech
that it depends upon such an artificially divided, if not blinkered, view of
reality. If he concedes, as surely he must, that a general's order to a
private is more likely to be obeyed than a private's order to a general,
then it follows that something more than the abstract meaning of the
words in question impacts upon the real-world import of speech.
Haiman's response appears to be that those other factors are all well
and good, but they have nothing to do with the fact that speech itself is
always symbolic. Conceding that such a separation is possible in theory,
there is no reason to make such a separation for purposes of free speech
analysis. To do so would be to remove from legal consideration much of
what actually matters. On that view, for example, the law could not
distinguish between Mike Tyson commanding a woman to undress and a
woman making the same demand of Mike Tyson.
Professor Haiman is mindful that his theory cannot be used to
decide cases, and he retreats from the implications of his analysis,
concluding that at least with respect to "direct threats and intimidation"
there comes a point "that no one would dispute validity of prohibiting
them."'26 Moreover, he acknowledges that such a judgment "cannot be
made out of context."' ' Therefore, he rejects any "theorist's a priori
decision to classify all threatening utterances as speech acts that are
categorically beyond the protection of the First Amendment. "12
Properly understood, Professor Haiman's analysis of symbolic versus
non-symbolic speech is compatible with the project of this Article.
Professor Haiman misses the broader implication of his analysis because
he insists upon the concept of "pure speech." Thus, for example, he
states that if "it is found that a victim has in fact been intimidated by an
utterance that any normal person might reasonably perceive as
menacing, it would then be appropriate to invoke legal remedies against
the pure speech in question."129 But since we have now seen that the
social meaning of speech is not even really intelligible outside of its
context, in what sense does it remain pure? In fact, the "symbolic" and
the "non-symbolic" are deeply intertwined. The real work to be done is
in finding ways to assess how the two interact and what First
126. HAIMAN, supra note 112, at 16.
127. Id. at 17.
128. Id. ("A threat by a 125-pound weakling to punch out a 250-pound football player is
not the same as the threat of a teenage gang ... to beat up or kill anyone who enters their
turf.").





Rejecting the intelligibility of the distinction between conduct and
speech altogether, Professor Robert Post proposes that instead we focus
upon the relevant social space/context.3 He contends that the Spence
test, for example, is "transparently and manifestly false."'31  It is not
enough to ask whether a given action is intended to communicate and is
received as communication, because that test would necessitate
protection of, for example, certain "defacement[s] of public property."' 32
Instead, Post observes (in line with Professor Nimmer and other
scholars):
Although a great deal of ink has been spilled on the question of
whether such symbolic conduct is or is not "speech" for purposes
of the First Amendment, a close analysis of these cases indicates
that they almost invariably turn on judicial scrutiny of the
purposes served by the regulation at issue."'
The appeal of neutrality analysis is that it shifts the focus away from the
difficult task of ascertaining the nature of the act that is subject to
regulation.
Without rejecting the utility of the government-purpose analysis,
Professor Post goes a step further and contends "that all legal values are
rooted in the experiences associated with local and specific kinds of
social practices."'34  First Amendment justifications are ultimately
130. See Post, supra note 14, at 1250 ("[T]he constitutional values advanced to justify
[First Amendment] protection inhere not in speech as such, but rather in particular social
practices."); see also TRIBE, supra note 108, at 831 ("The very notion of speech is, of course,
incomprehensible outside a cultural and social context. Thus activities ordinarily thought to
be speech-related need not be so in every setting."). Although Post's analysis seeks to
discredit the idea of a continuum between conduct and speech, it is nonetheless consistent
with my basic argument. The key point is that the same issues are raised in the crime/speech
and the conduct/speech contexts. If Post is right, then his theory of social context should also
prove decisive with respect to identifying the boundary between crime and speech for First
Amendment purposes.
131. Post, supra note 14, at 1252.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1256 (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992)).
134. Id. at 1272; see also Lee Tien, Publishing Software as a Speech Act, 15 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 629, 635 (2000) (contending that "[tlhe crucial issue as to whether an act is a
speech act is the speaker's intent in relation to social practices or conventions"). Tien takes a
narrower view of the role of social context in that he sees it as a part of intent analysis,
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social--even "self-realization is... a social, not merely a private,
practice."'35  Accordingly, rather than identify "generic constitutional
value,"'36 Post proposes that we recognize that "speech is always situated
in a real social space" and that "[t]he aspiration to make speech itself
the basic unit of First Amendment analysis thus leads ... directly to
doctrinal incoherence."' 37 The proper role of courts is in "recognizing,
defining, and attributing constitutional values to specific forms of social
order, and of grasping the function of speech in the achievement of
those constitutional values."'38
Although Professor Post contends that his analysis of speech as
situated in social practice is radically different than current doctrine, in
fact, it is largely another way of asking whether an audience would
understand that the speaker was communicating and not simply seeking
to accomplish a specific end. Social context enfolds considerations-
such as relative power of speaker and spoken-to--that effect the real-
world meaning of an utterance. Professor Post's emphasis on the
importance of social context is nonetheless valuable, because it offers a
sophisticated way of understanding speaker intent and listener reaction.
B. Applicable Principles
As the preceding discussion illustrates, courts and scholars have
taken a variety of approaches to identifying symbolic speech. For the
purposes of this Article, it will suffice to highlight some of the recurring
criteria. First, courts should consider whether it is reasonable to think
that communication was intended by a particular speech-act, and
whether it would likely be understood by an audience as
communication.'39 Second, courts should consider context carefully in
whereas Post treats social context as an independent factor.
135. Post, supra note 14, at 1273.
136. Id. at 1273.
137. Id. at 1274.
138. Id. at 1275.
139. See supra Part II.A.1. Speaker intent and listener understanding are almost, but
not quite, identical. From the listener's point of view, speech operates more or less like
conduct depending upon the listener's ability to mediate the speech through her own faculties
and to decide upon a course of action. A shout of "fire" in a movie theater does not leave
time for reflection or choice. Arguably the same might be said of blackmail, where the
compulsion of circumstance overrides the listener's ability to choose. The words are like
conduct in both examples, because they cause effects in the world without any meaningful
evaluation or choice on the listener's part.
One might focus instead upon the speaker's perspective. In that view, intent becomes
more important. When one shouts "fire" in a movie theater (whether from the best or the
worst motives) one intends to induce an immediate effect. But cf. Van Alstyne, supra note
2002]
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deciding whether a given speech-act should best be thought of as
expressive or non-expressive, because communication is a social practice
and exists within particular social contexts.14c Third, courts must be
mindful of the purpose of government regulation. 4' Laws that are more
focused upon the context of certain utterances (for example, situations
such as extortion where the utterance is backed by coercion) are more
likely to be valid than laws that target the actual ideas communicated-
such as, sedition laws.' 2
Situating symbolic speech analysis within a broader theoretical
context would improve upon the essentially standardless current
approach to distinguishing speech and crime and would provide a
measure of consistency in the law's treatment of expression."' The
labels "speech" and "crime" would become the end product of careful
analysis, rather than a substitute for such analysis. Those doctrinal
improvements would in turn make possible more thoughtful analysis of
the deeper questions-what First Amendment values are implicated by
the line drawn between speech and conduct, and how can those values
best be incorporated into the law?"'
14, at 114 (citing TOM STOPPARD, RoSENCRANTZ AND GUILDENSTERN ARE DEAD 60
(1967) (parodying this point by having an actor shout "fire!")). There is no need to offer
reasons for fleeing a burning house. Similarly, a blackmailer deliberately uses leverage
unrelated to the persuasiveness of her ideas, to compel obedience. In any event, the line
between the perspective of the speaker and the spoken-to is-as the examples above
illustrate-not a sharp one.
140. See supra Part II.A.3, 4.
141. See supra Part II.A.2.
142. For example, the laws of trespass, destruction of property, and air pollution may all
be applied to a flag burner, but the government may not specifically prohibit the burning of
the American flag in order to safeguard our values. See DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 41 (1998).
143. In addition, scholarly suggestions for improvement in how courts distinguish
conduct from "symbolic speech" might profitably be employed in the speech/crime context as
well. For example, as discussed supra Part III.A, Professor Robert Post has proposed an
analysis that turns more on the social context in which a given act is located than on whether
it can in some abstract sense be considered communicative. See Post, supra note 14, at 1250.
144. Professor Tribe argues that "the distinction between speech and conduct must be
seen at best as announcing a conclusion of the Court, rather than as summarizing in any way
the analytic processes which led the Court to that conclusion." TRIBE, supra note 108, at 827.
However, the Supreme Court has at least offered principles to guide the analysis. In addition,
even scholars such as Tribe who reject the utility of the speech/conduct distinction provide
methods of analyzing the applicability of the First Amendment to non-verbal acts. Those
theories can also be applied to verbal acts-regardless of whether the scholars embrace the
idea of a continuum between conduct and speech or seek to explode it. Whatever the analysis
advocated, this Article contends it should apply to all acts, verbal or non-verbal.
While Tribe insists upon the lack of a meaningful distinction between conduct and
speech, he identifies the possibility of escape devices only in the context of assessing whether
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III. DEFENDING THE DISTINCTION
The theory outlined above must navigate through a Scylla and
Charybdis of objections. On the one hand, some scholars assert that any
attempt to characterize speech as conduct or "speech plus" is
disingenuous. 45 On the other hand, scholars have argued that there is
no meaningful distinction between speech and conduct.46 As discussed
below, neither objection requires abandonment of the project.
A. Speech as Conduct
According to one argument, all utterances are equally speech and
any attempt to characterize them otherwise "is a mere cavil."147 Those
who would do so, the argument continues, rely upon "verbal
subterfuge" to avoid facing the fact that they are, in fact, abridging
speech.48 The argument serves as a useful reminder that wherever
courts are invested with power to make characterizations there is a
danger they will use that power to make second-order decisions by
verbal subterfuge. Even though courts are better able to distinguish
between conduct and expression than between speech and crime, that
does not mean they will be immune from the temptation to massage the
categories in order to reach a desired result.
The argument lacks merit, however, for two reasons. First, it
depends on the mistaken view that the First Amendment's "imperative
is simple, straightforward, complete, and absolute: Congress shall make
no law abridging the freedom of speech.""' As mountains of scholarship
and case law can attest, nothing could be further from the truth.
conduct amounts to speech. See id. at 826 n.7 (citing Harry Kalven, Jr., Upon Rereading Mr.
Justice Black On the First Amendment, 14 UCLA L. REV. 428 (1967)). He fails to notice
escape devices in the crime/speech context, even though the same kinds of boundary
distinctions are at issue. Thus, even recognizing that there are common questions involved in
deciding First Amendment coverage with respect to verbal and non-verbal acts would be a
substantial improvement over current doctrine. That might in turn lead to clearer thinking
about the constitutional values that Tribe rightly points out are implicated.
145. Van Alstyne, supra note 14, at 114 ("The shout of 'Fire!' is not less speech in the
Holmes instance than the shout of 'Fire!' from the mouth of an actor on the stage of the same
theater, spoken as but a word in a play."); see also HAIMAN, supra note 111, at 5.
146. John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1495-96 (1975); see also
Lawrence B. Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First Amendment
Freedom of Speech, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 54,110 (1989).
147. Van Alstyne, supra note 14, at 114.
148. Id. at 114, 136.
149. Id. at 111.
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Perhaps most importantly, the Constitution does not define "the
freedom of speech." If the First Amendment were entirely
straightforward (and intended to encompass every utterance of
whatever sort), it could have left out "the freedom of." As it stands, the
Amendment raises, but does not answer, the question of what defines
that freedom. " ° Thus, we must look to the purposes animating the First
Amendment in order to ascertain what counts as free speech within the
meaning of the First Amendment. It is not the task of this Article to
reassess those purposes, and it should suffice to note that "expression"
(whether personal or political) is usually at the top of the list.
Accordingly, a serious effort to sort speech by its expressiveness should
be viewed as a good-faith attempt to follow the First Amendment and
not a craven dodge."'
The argument that speech cannot ever be described as conduct lacks
merit for a second reason: it assumes that "speech" is a category that is
radically distinct from "conduct," such that any attempt to view one in
terms of the other could only be "mendacious."'52 In fact, as discussed in
the next subsection, the real issue is whether conduct and speech can be
separated in the first place.
B. Speech as Speech
The distinction between conduct and expression must meet the
objection that the two are not separate categories at all. It is undeniably
true that all speech is in a sense conduct, because it involves exhalation
150. Id. at 116 (stating that "[s]ome external referent must be used to provide the
distinction between that speech within 'the' freedom of speech and that speech not within
it"); see also id. at 123. It is somewhat curious that Professor Van Alstyne acknowledges this
point but also appears to condemn as disingenuous attempts to sort free speech from speech
that lacks the characteristics of free speech. Would it satisfy him if courts distinguished
between "speech" and "speech that has real-world effects closer in nature to conduct than
expression"? That is, after all, what it means to label speech as conduct.
Professor Van Alstyne further notes, without disapproval, that "ordinary criminal
solicitation" is generally considered to be outside the First Amendment. Id. at 117.
Ironically, by rejecting analysis of what about an utterance distinguishes punishable criminal
solicitation from speech of the sort sheltered by Brandenburg, Professor Van Alstyne makes
it more likely rather than less likely that a court will decide close cases by disingenuous
characterization.
151. Just applying labels, no matter how sophisticated, would not be enough, however.
For that reason, Justice Douglas's unexplained formulation "speech brigaded with action"
does not go far enough. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 456 (1969) (Douglas, J.,
concurring). Perhaps Professor Van Alstyne had labeling of that sort in mind when he
dismissed the possibility of identifying utterances that are not First Amendment speech but
rather conduct.
152. Van Alstyne, supra note 14, at 136; see also HAIMAN, supra note 112, at 5.
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of air across the vocal chords modified by the tongue and palate.53
Speech is also physical in that it is the embodiment of ideas that must
descend to the corporeal before they can be expressed.' More to the
point, some argue that so called "speech acts" do more than convey
abstract ideas-their promises, urgings, orders, and directions
"coordinate[] human conduct through understanding."'55 In that sense,
all speech is "100% action and 100% expression."' 6
As lawyers, if not philosophers, we can acknowledge that speech
may always be conduct and still distinguish between speech designed to
express an opinion and speech narrowly designed to effect some actual
change in the world."' Speech-act philosophy itself distinguishes
between assertions of fact and value and requests and orders.'58 Beyond
the formal qualities of a speech-act, we can also take into account
external factors and note that while "many... speech acts are 'conduct'
in a narrow sense.... not all of them have the power to produce...
effects or initiate a set of consequences; indeed, many of them are quite
comic in this regard .". .""' Thus, "[t]o act linguistically is not
153. See JOHN R. SEARLE, MIND, LANGUAGE, AND SOCIETY, 135-36 (1998). Writing
and typing could also be described in terms of the physical conduct necessary to their
production.
154. Cf JOHN DONNE, The Ecstasy, in THE COMPLETE POETRY AND SELECTED PROSE
OF JOHN DONNE & THE COMPLETE POETRY OF WILLIAM BLAKE 34 (Charles M. Coffin ed.,
1994) (arguing that love manifests itself through physical expression). "Love's mysteries in
souls do grow,/But yet the body is his book./And if some lover, such as weJHave heard this
dialogue of oneLet him still mark us, he shall see/Small change, when we are to bodies
gone." Id.
155. Solum, supra note 146, at 110.
156. Ely, supra note 146, at 1495-96; see also Solum, supra note 146, at 110.
157. Because the First Amendment assumes the foundational plausibility of a distinction
between conduct and speech, the criticism is larger in scope than the thesis of this Article.
Indeed, if true, that critique would make the entire enterprise of liberal free speech law and
scholarship an insupportable fiction. The consequences of the argument do not, of course,
refute it, but the burden of proof rests rather heavily with those who would deny the very
possibility of free speech. If those scholars are correct, then, as some cheerfully acknowledge,
the First Amendment bursts like a bubble and the test proposed here for determining its
scope is as useless as any other. See Pierre Schlag, How to Do Things with the First
Amendment, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1095 (1993); Stanley Fish, There's No Such Thing as Free
Speech and It's a Good Thing Too, BOSTON REV., Feb. 1992, at 23. It is tempting to view the
objections raised as abstract and epistemological. Just as our lives go on despite the
unanswerable possibility that all we experience is illusion and we are, to cite the classic
example, no more than a brain in a jar manipulated by an evil scientist, perhaps free speech
can scrape by just the same with judicious (if not entirely philosophically rigorous) appeal to
constitutional authority. The distinction remains necessary. We cannot organize a society or
live our lives in a world in which all such distinctions have collapsed.
158. See SEARLE, supra note 153, at 148-50 (listing various types of speech-acts).
159. JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH: A POLITICS OF THE PERFORMATIVE 16
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necessarily to produce effects."' 60
This Article contends that words that are spoken to accomplish a
specific end and that have no other expressive component are better
thought of as conduct than speech. For example, the words that
constitute an agreement to a contract effect a concrete change in the
legal rights and obligations of the parties to the contract. The language
of a contract amounts to conduct, because it operates directly to change
real-world relationships. 161  Similarly, words spoken to effectuate a
robbery-"put up your hands," "open the register," and "give me your
wallet -are narrowly purposive and designed to do rather than express
something.'62 They are simply a functional component of the robbery
and would not be understood by a listener as anything more. To be
sure, there is an expressive element to such speech in that it
communicates, among other things, the speaker's view of the relative
importance of his own needs compared with his victim's. But such
expression as may exist in the robber's orders is merely incidental and
entirely secondary to the accomplishment of the crime.'63 The words
would be spoken regardless of whether the victim would understand
their secondary expressive message.
One might object that the robber's words are also communicative in
the first instance inasmuch as they will not have any effect unless the
listener understands the language and, thus, the message communicated.
By labeling certain utterances conduct, I do not mean to suggest that
there is literally no communication involved, but that the speech-act as a
whole is better understood as conduct. For example, the robber's words
operate only to put in play the underlying threat of violence and do not
seek to persuade the listener through direct appeal to the listener's
capacity for reason (or even to the listener's capacity for emotional
suasion).
(1997) (characterizing "Austin's tract, How to Do Things with Words, as an amusing
catalogue of such failed performatives").
160. Id. at 17.
161. This is an example of what Professor J. L. Austin termed an "illocutionary"
utterance. See id. (explaining that "[t]he illocutionary speech act is itself the deed that it
effects"). Some scholars contend that pornography and hate speech are illocutionary-a
topic beyond the scope of this Article. See id. at 23 (criticizing that view on the ground that it
takes too fixed a view of language, ignoring the possibility of "restating" or "restructuring"
the speech in question).
162. Professor Austin labeled this kind of speech "perlocutionary" because it "merely
leads to certain effects that are not the same as the speech act itself." Id. at 3.
163. Cf. SEARLE, supra note 153, at 149 (stating that "orders and commands... cannot
be true or false, but they can be carried out, kept, or broken").
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The point can be generalized. Like robbery, blackmail and extortion
employ speech simply to convey the threat of concrete harm (whether
physical or on the reputation). By contrast, a speech appealing to an
audience without resort to some external compulsion operates as speech
in the first instance, and not simply as the delivery mechanism for other
criminal conduct. That is the case even for crudely racist speech that
advocates criminal conduct.'64
C. Additional Objections
There are a number of additional counter-arguments that might be
raised to the proposed threshold sorting of speech and crime along an
expressivity continuum. None of these is persuasive.
1. Expressive Crime
One might contend that while some crimes are not primarily about
expression, such as the mugging described above, others are. Consider,
for example, the Palestinian suicide bombers' attacks in Israel. The
bombers surely intend to express a political message. Distinguishing
crime and speech solely along the line of expressivity arguably poses the
problem of what to do about crimes committed precisely in order to
express an idea. Tying "crime" to the broader doctrinal category
"conduct" arguably requires justification of why courts should parse
crime and speech along the continuum of expressivity.
The "expressive-crime" objection fails, however, because it ignores
the neutrality principle central to symbolic speech. The government is
free to regulate expressive conduct so long as it does so for content-
neutral reasons. 65 The "expressive-crime" objection merely serves to
remind us that we need to be very careful to identify the locus of
expression-in the utterance or in related action. We should ask
whether the utterance itself is expressive or, rather, a narrow cog
facilitating the accomplishment of a criminal end. Although a terrorist
bombing may well be expressive, the government has powerful speech-
neutral reasons to stop it and to punish it. Moreover, the government
can regulate facilitating speech narrowly aimed at getting the crime
164. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 446 (1969) (per curiam) ("'We're not a
revengent organization, but if our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to
suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's possible that there might have to be some
revengeance taken.'") (citation omitted)).





If, on the other hand, the utterances are expressive by themselves-
such as in a Brandenburg style exhortation of a crowd-then those
utterances should be analyzed within the rubric of the First
Amendment. 67
2. Multiple Factors
One might also object to the expressivity continuum on the ground
that there are other factors, influencing whether a court should provide
free speech protection, that do not fit neatly into the continuum. To
name a few: (1) the speaker/audience relationship; (2) the specificity of
the speech; (3) the speaker's intent; (4) the political cast (if any) of the
speech; (5) whether the speech is public or private; and (6) the gravity of
the crime in question.
To say that speech can best -be evaluated along an expressivity
continuum does not mean that these features are irrelevant. Indeed,
this Article contends that social context is important. For instance, in
assessing whether a given speech-act was expressive, one would want to
know to whom (if anyone) it was communicated, the relative status of
speaker and audience, the intent of the speaker, and any number of
other contextual cues. However, courts need clarity. It is always
possible to imagine more nuanced tests, but it is worth asking whether
the greater complexity yields precision that is worth the unwieldiness.'
3. Erasing the Boundary
One might also ask why courts should employ a threshold test at all.
Why not treat all speech as cognizable under the First Amendment?
The answer to that question depends upon what it means to apply the
First Amendment. If, on the one hand, it is suggested that bribery and
extortion should receive the high-level of protection described in
Brandenburg, the notion is ridiculous. No sensible theory of the
166. That is to say, the government is free to regulate the criminal conduct for any
speech-neutral reason.
167. And it is quite possible that the danger, imminence, and other factors would
warrant regulation. Regulating speech without regard to the First Amendment would,
however, be improper.
168. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 864
(1991) (noting that "First Amendment doctrine is almost infinitely complex"); Van Alstyne,
supra note 14, at 109 ("Nicely qualified, complex formulations may be necessary and proper
for statutory codes. They may be profoundly uninspiring in a constitution-the fundamental
law of a nation.").
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purposes and principles underlying the First Amendment would permit
such a reading,'69 and it would accord an almost sacred significance to
speech-acts as opposed to other acts. If, on the other hand, it is
suggested that the First Amendment appeal of low value speech (such as
bribery and extortion) can be rather summarily dismissed, then we have
simply replicated the debate within the confines of the First
Amendment. How we are to distinguish speech and crime is not solved
by declaring at the outset that the First Amendment applies to all
speech.
Rather than distorting its meaning, we should reserve the First
Amendment category for speech that is more than simply the means of
accomplishing a crime. There is no good reason to include bomb threats
and ransom notes along with political arguments. Moreover-although
it may be attacked for positing a false distinction between speech and
conduct-this Article's suggested threshold analysis actually minimizes
the distinction even as it employs it. Utterances are speech-acts, a mix
of speech and conduct-by excluding some speech-acts from the scope
of the First Amendment's coverage, this Article acknowledges the
duality of speech. By contrast, stating that all speech receives some level
of First Amendment protection would seem to reinforce the
philosophically discredited view that speech is radically different from
other kinds of conduct.
IV. THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN SPEECH AND CRIME RECONSIDERED
In light of the principles outlined above, we are now in a position to
revisit the cases discussed earlier as examples of problematic decision-
making. As we have seen, the confused state of the law has made it
difficult for courts to approach the task of separating speech and crime.
A review of the cases discussed in Part I in light of the principles
identified in Part II points the way to a more fruitful discourse.
A. Hit Man
Although it correctly identifies the tension between the criminal law
and the freedom of speech, the Fourth Circuit in Rice v. Paladin
169. Many justifications for the First Amendment have been advanced, and this author
does not take sides here. In brief, those theories include: (1) political participation; (2) the
marketplace of ideas; (3) self-expression; and (4) venting steam. See HAIMAN, supra note
112, at 7 (summarizing some of the most commonly cited justifications for freedom of
speech). To that list we should add Professor Lee Bollinger's argument that free speech
promotes toleration. See generally LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY (1995).
20021
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Enterprises, Inc.7° avoids grappling with the difficulty by relying upon
worst case scenarios. One can freely concede that the government must
have the power to protect its citizens and still feel that First Amendment
interests restrict the government's power to punish speech. The court is
unconvincing to the extent it suggests that allowing the First
Amendment "to limit government regulation" is tantamount to leaving
government "powerless" to enforce its criminal law.17'
In order to make its decision to treat Hit Man as outside the scope of
the First Amendment more plausible, the court offered a loaded
description of the speech involved. After opening its decision with
extensive and inflammatory excerpts from Hit Man, the court described
the contract killer as "readied by [Hit Man's] instructions and steeled by
[its] seductive adjurations."'72 This characterization is unexplained and
unconvincing. The writer of Hit Man appears to the reader only as a
disembodied voice, and the author has no coercive power over the
reader other than by the rhetorical power of his words.'73 In terms of the
Spence test,"' the book is both intended and likely to be understood as
communication. By "steeled," therefore, the court appears to mean
something along the lines of "likely to result in real world
consequences," and, almost by definition, that is just another way of
saying "persuasive."
Also unexplained is the court's statement that the speech was
"tantamount" to "proscribable... conduct.""175  If all speech that
advocated illegal activity were "tantamount" to the illegal activity itself,
then there would be no freedom to advocate what is unlawful and
Brandenburg would be a dead letter. Without more, the statement
suggests that there is no distinction between illegal conduct and speech
that encourages it. Although it is possible that the First Amendment
would not ultimately.require protection of the speech contained in Hit
Man, it seems unlikely that commercial book publishing, a well
170. 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997).
171. Id. at 244 ("Were the First Amendment to bar or to limit government regulation of
such 'speech brigaded with action,' the government would be powerless to protect the public
from countless of even the most pernicious criminal acts and civil wrongs.") (citation
omitted).
172. Id. at 239 (emphasis added).
173. The situation would obviously be quite different if, for example, a general were
ordering a subordinate to engage in an illegal activity. See GREENAWALT, supra note 18, at
65 ("If a person with authority directs a subordinate to perform an act, the second person has
a new duty to perform.").
174. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,409 (1974) (per curiam).
175. Paladin, 128 F.3d at 243.
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established means of communication in our society, could be understood
as "conduct."
By conflating book publishing'with the private solicitation of
murder, the court gave little weight to the social context of the speech.
Publishing a book is perhaps the paradigmatic example of free speech.
It may be possible to commit a crime by publishing a book, at least
under certain narrow circumstances, but the court failed to adequately
distinguish book publishing from, say, Lawrence Horn's private
solicitation of a contract killer. The court noted only that the publisher
sold its wares primarily by mail order, concluding that a jury could "find
that Hit Man is not at all distributed to the general public and that,
instead, it is available only to a limited, self-selected group of people
interested in learning from and being trained. by a self-described
professional killer."176 Yet, many small publishers (including academic
publishers) do not distribute to the general public, and the court fails to
explain why publishers who distribute their books at Barnes & Noble
and Borders should be accorded more First Amendment protection
than those who rely upon other means of distribution.177
Somewhat more persuasively, the Fourth Circuit posited a
distinction between abstract advocacy and specific instructions. The
court observed that Hit Man couples advocacy with specific instructions
and cited the Ninth Circuit for the proposition that "the First
Amendment does not provide publishers a defense as a matter of law to
charges of aiding and abetting a crime through the publication and
distribution of instructions. '178 There is authority for distinguishing
between advocating anarchy as a general matter and disseminating
precise bomb-making instructions. Dissenting from the conviction of
Marxist leafletters in Dennis v. United States,'79 Justice Douglas opined
that "[i]f this were a case where those who claimed protection under the
First Amendment were teaching the techniques of sabotage," the
convictions might be justified because "the teaching of methods of
terror and other seditious conduct should be beyond the pale."'"8 A
176. Id. at 255.
177. To the contrary, it may be the case that the First Amendment should provide more
protection to those who lack resources. For example, some have justified efforts to limit the
size of campaign contributions on the ground that those limits afford an opportunity for
citizens of average means to make their voices heard.
178. Paladin, 128 F.3d at 244 (citing United States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835 (9th Cir.
1982)).
179. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
180. Id. at 581 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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distinction between abstract advocacy and specific instructions also runs
through the tax-evasion cases.
While there is authority for the distinction drawn by the Fourth
Circuit, the court does not explain why instructions are more like
conduct than speech in the context of Hit Man's advocacy of the
assassin's lifestyle. The court condemns Hit Man in part for its
"seductive adjurations.', 181  Although the presence of specific
instructions may affect the analysis under Brandenburg by allowing a
fact finder to more easily find the requisite elements for liability-
incitement, imminence, likelihood, and intent-the utter removal of
First Amendment protection would require more justification than the
Fourth Circuit provides. Specificity is, after all, a tool of advocacy. Any
college textbook on persuasive speaking will emphasize the importance
of providing the listener with a clear explanation of how to achieve the
goal advocated by the speaker. The First Amendment surely shelters
more than ineffective speech.
The Fourth Circuit failed to grapple with the complexity of the task
before it and erred in citing Brandenburg for the simplistic proposition
that "'[t]he cloak of the First Amendment envelops critical, but abstract,
discussions of existing laws, but lends no protection to speech which
urges the listeners to commit violations of current law.' 1 12 The Hit Man
case concerned a book filled with undoubtedly offensive and evil advice,
but for the reasons discussed above, the publisher was nonetheless
entitled to some level of First Amendment protection. 3
B. Angel Dust
The court in United States v. Barnett'8 observed that crimes are often
committed using speech and cited as examples "[t]he use of a printed
message to a bank teller requesting money coupled with a threat of
violence, the placing of a false representation in a written contract, the
181. 128 F.3d at 239.
182. Id. at 246 (quoting United States v. Kelley, 769 F.2d 215, 217 (4th Cir. 1985)). The
Fourth Circiit ignores the language of the opinion and the history of its interpretation by the
Supreme Court. See supra Part I.A (summarizing case law).
183. Whether the First Amendment would 'require application of the Brandenburg
standard is a question of content, beyond the purview of this Article. Professor Smolla has
suggested that one might look instead to libel law precedent and require a lower level of
intent, rather than "mechanically and blindly" applying Brandenburg in a very different
context. See Rodney A. Smolla, The First Amendment and New Forms of Civil Liability, 88
VA. L. REV. 919,940-42 (2002).
184. 667 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1982).
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forging of a check, and the false statement to a government official."'85
While correct as far as it goes, the court's observation does not help it to
articulate why the particular speech involved in the case before it fell
into the category of crime rather than into the category of advocacy of
illegal acts protected by Brandenburg.
As support for its decision, the court simply cited an earlier case,
United States v. Buttorff6 in which defendants were not allowed a First
Amendment defense for speeches encouraging violation of federal tax
laws. 7 The Barnett court did not necessarily err by refusing to apply the
First Amendment, but it failed to provide sufficient justification for its
decision. The court should have at least acknowledged that some
speech that encourages law violation does receive First Amendment
protection-for example, the rabble rousing in the seminal First
Amendment cases Brandenburg,' -Hess, '9 and Watts." The court might
then have distinguished those cases by pointing out (1) that the drug
instruction manuals contained little if any advocacy, and (2) were mailed
directly to those interested, such that the defendant made a conscious
decision to facilitate each individual crime.'91 Under the Spence test,"2 it
appears that the defendant intended to assist in the commission of a
crime, and that the recipient of the instructions would understand them
in those terms, rather than as communication. Thus, applying the theory
of "symbolic speech," the court might have concluded that the
instruction manuals were, in effect, non-symbolic conduct.
The Barnett court might further have considered whether the
government's prosecution was speech-neutral. Although one could
argue that the government intended to suppress speech advocating drug
use, it seems more plausible to characterize the prosecution as part of a
broader effort to stop the manufacture and sale of illegal drugs.
Moreover, unlike the Hit Man case, Barnett did not involve a
commercial publisher.9  The mailing of a Xeroxed instruction manual
185. Id. at 842.
186. 572 F.2d 619 (8th Cir. 1978).
187. Id. at 628.
188. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
189. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam).
190. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam).
191. With Hit Man, by contrast, the publisher sent out into the world at large a book
which contained instructions that might be misused but which also contained advocacy and,
arguably, entertainment value.
192. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,409 (1974) (per curiam).
193. United States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1982).
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from one individual to another does not implicate any of the traditional
fora of free speech. Thus, the court might properly have concluded that
the instruction manual fell closer to conduct than speech and allowed
the criminal laws to operate without First Amendment constraint.
Instead, the Barnett court needlessly escaped the First Amendment
by treating the answer to the question whether the crime of aiding and
abetting was committed as dispositive of the question whether the First
Amendment applied.'94 The court did not realize or else ignored the fact
that the categories of crime and speech sometimes overlap.
C. Taxes
In United States v. Buttorff"5 by contrast, the court stated the First
Amendment issue clearly and seemed to understand that what was at
stake was the advocacy of ideas. Unfortunately, the court nonetheless
allowed the convictions of the advocates of tax evasion to stand.9
Pronouncing it "relevant," the court quoted a long passage from a
district court decision authored by Judge Learned Hand in 1917.197 The
passage quoted concludes as follows: "If one stops short of urging upon
others that it is their duty or their interest to resist the law, it seems to
me one should not be held to have attempted to cause its violation."'98
By implication, one might assume then that it would violate the law to
urge others "that it is their duty or their interest to resist the law."
Yet modern First Amendment law, as embodied in Brandenburg,
goes much further and the Buttorff court was constrained to
acknowledge the existence of more recent Supreme Court precedent
contrary to the lengthy excerpt of Judge Hand's reasoning: "More
recently, the Supreme Court has distinguished between speech which
merely advocates law violation and speech which incites imminent
lawless activity. See Brandenburg v. Ohio .... The former is protected;
the latter is not. 199
Case closed? Not so fast. The court found that while "the speeches
here [did] not incite the type of imminent lawless activity referred to in
criminal syndicalism cases, the defendants did go beyond mere advocacy
194. Id. at 842-43.
195. 572 F.2d 619 (8th Cir. 1978).
196. Id. at 628.
197. See id. at 624 (citing Masses Publ'g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1917),
rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917)).
198. Id. (citing Masses, 244 F. at 540).
199. Id. (citation omitted).
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of tax reform."' '  The court found it beyond the pale that the
defendants actually "explained how to avoid withholding." 0'
Apparently, according to the court, a speaker loses First Amendment
protection by descending from the realm of airy abstraction and
providing listeners with some idea of how to accomplish the goals
advocated.
Under the principles outlined in Part II, the court's analysis could
not withstand scrutiny. The Buttorff defendants were plainly at the
speech end of the continuum. For example, under the Spence test,202 one
would be hard pressed to conclude other than that the defendants
intended to communicate ideas and were understood to be
communicating. The court concedes as much. Moreover, the social
space involved is paradigmatically one of free speech-speakers
standing on a soap box before a large audience, seeking to persuade.
The court escaped the First Amendment by interpreting it so narrowly
that even what seems archetypal free speech-inspiring a large crowd
with one's view of the Constitution-may be freely punished as the
crime of aiding and abetting, if the listeners are actually persuaded and
later disobey the law.
D. Natural Born Killers
That a court allowed a lawsuit to proceed against Oliver Stone
because someone imitated a character in one of his movies23 illustrates
the lingering ill-effects caused by First Amendment escape devices. The
court was required to accept the plaintiff's factual allegations as true for
purposes of a motion to dismiss, but it might easily have relied upon a
long line of so-called "copycat" cases and concluded that media
defendants cannot be held responsible every time a mentally-disturbed
person confuses fantasy with reality. 4 Absent the Hit Man decision, the
Louisiana court might have found it harder to discount the First
Amendment implications of subjecting media defendants to potentially
enormous liability for producing a movie that explores violent themes. 2'
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,409 (1974) (per curiam).
203. See Byers v. Edmonson, 712 So. 2d 681 (La. Ct. App. 1998).
204. See generally Andrew B. Sims, Tort Liability for Physical Injuries Allegedly
Resulting from Media Speech: A Comprehensive First Amendment Approach, 34 ARIz. L.
REV. 231 (1992).
205. The lawyer for the plaintiffs in Hit Man has conceded as much:
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Under the standard proposed in this Article, Natural Born Killers
easily falls on the speech side of the continuum. First, most people
would surely understand Oliver Stone's popular movie as expression. In
terms of social space, movies are generally understood as
communication, and the local cineplex is widely recognized as a place
for artistic expression. In addition, whether or not he intended viewers
to commit the crimes depicted, Oliver Stone had no power to coerce the
theater-attending public to obey."" Any untoward consequences would
follow only if he persuaded the audience of the desirability of homicidal
behavior.
To the extent the malleability of the initial distinction between
speech and crime results from the very inflexibility of current First
Amendment doctrine, it might be argued that some such room to
breathe is necessary. First Amendment protections must be rigid if they
are to weather tides of popular opinion, such as those that have
previously swept the court into complicity with censorship, but that
inflexibility also has costs. Brandenburg's categorical approach requires
courts to fit real-world facts to a Procrustean bed of incitement, gravity,
and imminence. Arguably, much of the significance must be chopped
away or stretched beyond recognition to meet such an unforgiving
standard.
If Brandenburg goes too far and overprotects in some situations,
some might argue that flexibility concerning the First Amendment's
scope allows courts to espouse an absolutist view of free speech while at
the same time allowing sensible restrictions. Such a system thereby
preserves the First Amendment's symbolic value. Taken to its logical
conclusion, this would amount to tacit approval of escape devices. Such
arguments have been made in other contexts. For example, Professor
Yale Kamisar has suggested a similar compromise regarding physician-
assisted suicide: leave it illegal and trust that doctors will ignore the law
in the right cases. 7 The cost to such an approach, however, is that it can
The Natural Born Killers case was a defeat for the First Amendment, and thus a
victory for Paladin, enabling it to crow "I told you so." This was precisely what
Paladin and its numerous amici in our suit had warned against. We'd claimed they
were all Chicken Littles shouting that the sky was falling. But now they can assert
that the sky is indeed beginning to fall.
SMOLLA, supra note 2, at 265.
206. In any event, unlike the publishers of Hit Man who stipulated to intent for purposes
of summary judgment, nothing in the court's decision indicates a similar intent on Oliver
Stone's part.
207. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, Physician-Assisted Suicide: The Problems Presented by the
Compelling, Heartwrenching Case, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1121 (1998). Professor
[86:501
CRIMINAL SPEECH
lead to arbitrary results because decision-making is no longer
constrained by explicit standards. The outcome of each case depends
largely upon the sensibilities of the individual decision-maker.08 In the
case of assisted suicide, that cost may be worth bearing. Unlike doctors,
however, courts must articulate a rationale for their decisions. If courts
fail to engage openly and honestly with the difficulty inherent in
marking the scope of free speech, they will create misleading precedents
for future courts.
V. CONCLUSION
The lack of coherent, formal distinctions between First Amendment
speech and criminal speech is troublesome, because the categories
overlap and courts act with little guidance in deciding when speech is
"speech" within the meaning of the First Amendment and when it is
crime. Yet courts cannot avoid the question and must somehow decide
when speech becomes imbued with enough of the qualities of crime that
it falls outside of the scope of the First Amendment. The issue is always
whether an utterance in some way connected with crime is simply part
of a criminal act or whether it also contains some quality sufficient to
warrant treating it as speech.
While the most stringent version of the Brandenburg test cannot
realistically be applied to all speech, this Article contends that the
boundaries of the First Amendment must be drawn by the light of open
and honest discourse. Applying the principles that animate the
distinction between conduct and expression, rather than just the labels,
will help courts to better distinguish between speech and crime. By
undertaking the more rigorous analysis involved, courts will more often
be able to resist the temptation to use escape devices to avoid the First
Amendment altogether.
Kamisar argues by analogy to torture and points out that in some circumstances-for
example, to avert an imminent catastrophe-the authorities would resort to torture and
society would not complain. See id. at 1144-45. Yet, "by refusing to acknowledge that we
should balance the costs and benefits of torture'as a general matter, we strengthen the
presumption against torture and maximize the likelihood that it will only be resorted to in the
rarest and most compelling circumstances." Id. at 1145.
208. Legal realists and post-modernists argue that judicial decisions, to varying degrees,
in fact turn on extra-legal considerations. Those descriptive claims are not generally tied to a
normative claim. In other words, realists and post-modernists challenge the existence of law
but do not claim that the politically and ideologically driven reality they perceive is a viable
alternative. Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 3 (1977) (stating that on a
realist account, "judges actually decide cases according to their own political or moral tastes,
and then choose an appropriate legal rule as a rationalization.").
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